Introduction
Recent experiences gained during the financial crisis indicate that designing an appropriate safety net, which assures banking system stability but does not exacerbate the natural drive of banks towards excessive risk, continues to be a challenging task for regulators worldwide. On the other hand, discussions continue on creating pan-European deposit insurance schemes and bank rescue funds, thus making the question of optimal safety net features quite urgent. In addition, as ten Central European countries are already part of the European Union, their share in potential pan-European safety net schemes is certain. Meanwhile, scarce empirical work specifically targets Central European banks. In addition, these financial institutions have a strikingly different shareholder structure than their Western European counterparts. The dominance of majority ownership in Central European banks certainly affects their policies and may also influence the effects that safety nets have upon their risk taking. Specific literature in that area is also very narrow.
The aim of this paper is to fill these gaps.
In our paper, we assess the effect of safety net features and shareholder structure upon bank risk taking in Central Europe in the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . We analyse the regulatory broadening of safety net and analyse its influence upon the level of risk in individual Central European banks, in the light of possible higher moral hazard incentives. If there is such a link, a policy of increasing financial stability in the form of higher deposit insurance or institutional help for ailing banks may be counter effective, with individual banks taking higher risks as a result. The second field of our study relates to shareholder structure -its relationship with bank risk levels and potential adjustments it may cause in moral hazard incentives from the safety net. In case of financial difficulties, banks with more powerful shareholders may rely on support from their owners rather than on institutional help from deposit insurance providers or lender of last resort facilities (be it the central bank or the government). This hypothesis is particularly important for Central European banks, the bulk of which have strong, majority owners in the form of foreign financial institutions.
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In order to verify the above hypotheses, we first analyse the safety net features in Central Europe, relying mostly on regulations and annual reports of deposit insurance institutions for [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . This, in addition to data on institutional help to the financial sector, allows us to create a time-varying database of safety net features for 11 Central European countries. Individual bank year-end data are taken from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database, regarding both balance sheet data and shareholder structure. As a result, in contrast to most existing empirical literature 1 ,
we are able to assess the effect of changes in safety net features and shareholder structure upon individual bank risk taking. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 presents a brief literature review, in Section 2 we describe our methodology and data, Section 3 demonstrates main estimation results, Section 4 includes some robustness tests, followed by the general conclusions.
Institutional safety net, shareholders and bank risk takingliterature review
Deposit insurance has in recent years become a widespread policy tool aimed at increasing banking system stability. Numerous state interventions in Western European and US banks during the financial crisis have proven that state aid can also be relied upon in difficult times, regardless of the regulatory framework.
Industrialised countries have been using both deposit insurance and state aid in their policies, which implies a positive view of policymakers on these tools. However, conclusions from the literature are not so uniform.
The seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) underlines the necessity of deposit insurance schemes, as they diminish the probability of a bank run and enhance banking system stability. Single bank runs and bank failures may feed into larger banking crises, due to contagion effects stemming from e.g. system-wide liquidity shortages (Diamond and Rajan 2005) . Generally, banking crises are costly to the economy as a whole, which has been well proven by the recent [2007] [2008] [2009] crisis, and limiting the probability of such adverse events is seen as a main argument supporting the introduction of deposit insurance schemes.
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On the other hand, safety nets are frequently regarded as one of the sources of moral hazard and thus increased risk taking in banks ( Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002) . Merton (1977) analyses deposit insurance as a put option on the bank's assets. Bank owners and/or managers are tempted to raise the risk taken by their bank in order to increase their option value. Keeley (1990) demonstrate that fixed-rate deposit insurance systems lead banks to take more risk in order to increase the option value. Deposit insurance is viewed as a subsidy from the insurance providers to the bank and the value of such a subsidy may be maximised through increasing asset risk or decreasing capital (Keeley 1990, Gueyie and Lai 2003) . 2 If banks take higher risks because of the sense of security provided by the institutional safety nets, the original aim of these safety nets may be not fulfilled.
Some authors indicate that the source of moral hazard is not the conflict between bank shareholders and the safety net providers, but between bank shareholders and bank creditors (Barth et al. 2006) . Bank owners enjoy limited liability status and increase risk taking at the cost of bank creditors (depositors and debt holders), who suffer losses in case of bank bankruptcy. The wealth transfer in such a case takes place between shareholders and creditors, where increased risk creates the option value of equity.
One of the mechanisms that curb exploiting creditors' interests and bank excessive risk taking is market discipline. It is assumed to be exerted by depositors and bank debt holders, who -institutional safety nets being absent -monitor bank risk and expect higher yield from higher risk banks. Safety nets may distort this process and the bulk of literature studies the effect of introducing or changing safety nets on market discipline and bank risk taking (see among others, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2004 , Nier and Baumann 2006 , Barth et al. 2006 . Recent studies on cross-country samples of individual banks provide evidence that market discipline leads to lower risk taking and the effect is stronger for banks with increased shareholder control (Forssbaeck 2011 (2011) analyse Russian banks and find that participation in deposit insurance scheme changes the financial structure of the bank, with growth in nominal deposits and in the share of deposits to assets. In addition, the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme leads to higher risk taking by banks in Russia. Cross-country analyses based on individual bank data show that government safety nets diminish bank capital buffers and they reduce the positive effect of market discipline on capital levels (Nier and Baumann 2006).
Safety nets usually weaken market discipline and this result is empirically demonstrated on different bank and country samples. Government guarantees reduce market discipline in Indonesian banks, although the relation may depend on the credibility and delay in payouts of these guarantees (Hadad et al. 2011) . In crosscountry samples, safety nets in the form of government guarantees also diminish the positive effect of market discipline (Nier and Baumann 2006) . In a recent crosscountry analysis based on individual bank data, Forssbaeck (2011) proves that market discipline reduces bank risk taking, although the effect is relatively small.
The importance of accounting for shareholder structure has been repeatedly underlined in the literature. Banks with stakes owned by governments are proven to be less efficient (Berger et al. 2005 , Iannotta et al. 2007 and Iannotta et al. 2012 ). On the other hand, the dispersed shareholder structure of the US and Western European banks differs significantly from the strongly concentrated ownership in Central 2 8
European financial institutions and thus it is particularly important to verify the role of shareholder structure in such a setting.
The relation between insider control and bank risk taking may be U-shaped, although Forssbaeck (2011) demonstrates that the negative effect predominates. This implies that higher ownership concentration may lead to more elevated risk taking, although the results strongly depend on bank leverage. State ownership of banks is associated with relatively high risk taking, as found by Berger et al. (2005) and Forssbaeck (2011) . The latter indicates that this effect is associated with high explicit deposit protection. In addition, foreign ownership in this study is also related to higher risk taking in some risk specifications, but not in countries with high explicit deposit insurance. On a country level, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that public ownership has no effect on the banking system stability and banking crisis probability. Laeven and Levine (2009) In a recent analysis of Western European banks, Iannotta et al. (2012) demonstrate that government owned institutions have lower risk than their private owned counterparts, but this lower risk should be attributed to government support, as their standalone financial risk is more elevated. On the other hand, market discipline is more pronounced in listed and foreign banks (Hadad et al. 2011) . For
European banks, Barry et al. (2011) If Hypothesis 2 is confirmed, it implies that corporate governance in Central European banks may change moral hazard incentives generated by broadening of safety net schemes and thus should be accounted for in policy decisions. In order to empirically verify Hypothesis 2, we use the following specification:
Shareholder Structure includes variables relating to characteristics of the primary shareholder, such as stake size and type of owner, for each bank and year.
In addition, it comprises interaction variables, representing sensitivity to safety net changes in conjunction with shareholder characteristics. The details are specified in 3 11 the following section. Equation (2) is also estimated as a fixed effects, static model, with a robustness check using a random effects approach (Section 4).
3.2.Data
In our estimation we use year-end bank data from 11 countries in Central Europe, for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] 
Risk proxies
There is no uniform proxy for bank risk taking in the literature and many authors use several specifications to test parallel risk indicators (see eg. Forssbaeck 2011, Barry et al. 2011 or Laeven and Levine 2009) . Nier and Baumann (2006) underline the difference between ex ante indicators of risk, which are meant to demonstrate the probability of default of a bank, or its realised and unrealised risk 13 level, and ex post risk proxies, representing the realised risk portion. We borrow Nier nad Baumann's (2006) risk division and apply it throughout our paper.
Although it falls outside the scope of this analysis, we want to underline that the decision of choosing risk proxies is fundamental to empirical bank analyses. The empirical literature on bank risk taking and the safety net does not provide a clear indication as to which proxies are the most appropriate, and the wide variety of ratios used confirms the choice problem of bank researchers. In the course of our analysis we find severe differences in results, depending on risk proxies used. Hence our decision of presenting all risk proxies, even if it makes the interpretation not as clear-cut as we would wish.
In terms of ex ante risk proxies, Zscore remains probably the most popular measure. Zscore is usually defined as a default probability, or the distance of the bank to default. There are many forms of Zscore, but the main version is defined as the relation of the sum of average return on assets ( In our estimation we also use Zscore as a primary risk indicator, mostly following Hadad et al. (2011) and Le (2012) , with three year moving windows for both the mean ROA and standard deviation of ROA, and natural logarithm of Zscore. Ex post risk proxies generally base on asset risk, and more specifically -on the quality and reserves made for the loan portfolio. In view of massive market risk exposures of many large banks, and the current credit risk exposures inherent within government securities portfolios, the loan quality risk ratios may not be optimal.
However, Central European banks are generally not as exposed to market risk as (Hadad et al. 2011) or even loan to assets ratios (Chernykh and Cole 2011) .
In our estimation we use loan loss provisions (LLP) as a measure of ex post risk, supplemented by non-performing loans (NPL) and loan loss reserves (LLR). LLP is our primary ex post risk proxy, as provisions are an obligatory element of the profit and loss account and are reported by all banks in the sample. They refer not only to the quality of the asset portfolio but also reflect bank policies towards asset risk, whereas non-performing loans are just reported bad loans. In addition, the NPL and LLR reported in Bankscope may not always fully reflect their true levels as revealed to the supervisory authorities, while such discrepancies on the level of LLP are rare.
In our estimation, loan loss provisions are used in relation to total assets, while both NPL and LLR refer to total loans.
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Control variables
A range of bank-internal and macroeconomic variables is used in our estimation, to control for bank-specific and economic environment factors that may affect bank risk taking. Level of equity relative to assets is used to control for bank leverage (Equity). In order to avoid endogeneity of leverage with Zscore, we use a one year lag. Banks with ample capital cushions are prone to approach risk differently than banks with a high leverage. We include loan growth (Loan growth)
as a control for bank expansion and also -to some extent -market conditions. Some
Central European countries witness periods of extensive credit growth and this may shape risk behaviours. Similarly, a share of loans in total assets (Loan share)
demonstrates the credit-intensity of an individual bank business, which to some extent accounts for banks type. Parallel to this, the ratio of loans to deposits (Loan deposit ratio) accounts for the funding part and the degree of using client funding in loan growth and total assets account for size (Size). The set of macroeconomic variables is standard, with GDP growth, GDP per capita and inflation controlling for the external environment where banks operate.
We believe it is important to briefly illustrate the content of our data before moving on to the results. Despite the fact that our sample is relatively homogenous, in comparison to similar work on the subject (see e.g. 
Bank assets in 2010
Population in 2010 0 5,000 10,000
15,000 20,000 (Table   3) indicate that some specifications regarding the relationship between risk and state aid during crisis times should also be included. 
Regulatory data
Since the late 1990s, intensive work on revising the Basle capital regulations has brought increased attention to diverging international banking regulations in as to the optimal construction of the deposit insurance system. The guidelines specify the objectives of the system, its mandates and powers, the governance structure, relationships with other safety-net participants and cross border issues, details of membership and coverage, as well as funding. The document underlines the important role of public awareness and of ensuring an optimal legal environment for the deposit insurance to operate in, while caring for proper reimbursement of depositors and the correct recovery process from the failed banks. The outline of a broadly discussed issue of failure resolution has also been included in the core principles.
Although the scope of the BCBS IADI core principles is large, they are not constructed as specific regulations that may be adopted by national deposit insurance funds. Instead, the principles indicate main areas where regulators should consider available options and implement own policies. Nonetheless, they provide a sound base for a uniform international approach to the construction of the deposit insurance system, even if they are just the first step on the way to implementing detailed national regulations.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Union has taken legal steps to harmonise deposit insurance across its member countries. The European Commission has introduced regulations setting deposit insurance limits. All member countries, including all countries in our sample, have introduced these EU limits in their respective regulations, with some members imposing higher limits in advance (Lithuania). As a result, larger heterogeneity as to nominal deposit insurance in the region only lasted until 2008. On the other hand, taking into account the earlier described divergence in the macroeconomic and banking environment in the region, some doubts about setting a uniform nominal deposit insurance limit could be voiced. Apart from deposit insurance limit, all countries in our sample converged towards the full insurance model, with earlier co-insurance eliminated in the whole sample by the end of 2008.
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Regulatory data regarding deposit insurance in our sample has been handcollected, basing on annual reports from deposit insurance funds and other safety-net institutions, current and historical legal acts, and supplemented by data received directly from respective deposit insurance funds. Data on state aid is based on European Commission reports and databases. The general descriptive statistics of safety net data is shown in Table 2 . The more detailed description of dummy variables is shown in Table 4 and their annual values in insured deposits, as in systems with coinsurance the structure usually included a lower deposit insurance limit, where full coverage was available, and a higher limit with 10% coinsurance. Only Czech Republic and Slovakia had coinsurance for the whole deposit amount. [2008] [2009] [2010] and the amount of this aid (in relation to GDP) is demonstrated by Total crisis aid.
Shareholder data
All shareholder data in our sample comes from the Bankscope database. We have hand-checked the primary shareholder stakes in all available annual reports and found existing data in Bankscope (both current and historical) as reliable.
Shareholder data in our sample is year-end data for every year, even if generally changes between years are not frequent or large. The details of the shareholder structure in the sample are shown in Table 6 .
Primary shareholder denotes the stake held by the largest shareholder in a given year. Holding majority stakes is the main ownership model in Central
European banks, as demonstrated in Basing on the Primary shareholder variable and data on shareholder type from Bankscope, we construct dummy variables relating to full-and majority ownership and single out banks with bank owners and government owners. In addition, we account for a possible government influence upon bank activities even if the stake is not a majority one, and assume a 10% government share to this aim.
However, the amount of banks with government participation is very small (under 5%). Among banks which are majority owned, three quarters have bank owners, in a form of a direct or indirect stake of a large, Western European financial institution. 
Results

Hypothesis 1
We start our estimation by verifying Hypothesis 1, stating that broadening of the elements inducing moral hazard in the form of the safety net, may have an effect on individual bank risk taking. Tables 8 and 9 present results of estimating Equation
(1), in different specifications. The first estimation series (Table 8 ) uses the ex ante risk proxies, mainly ZScore, but also the volatility of ROA and the volatility of preprovisioning income (both calculated as standard deviations with three year moving windows). The second estimation series (Table 9 ) uses the ex post risk proxies, based on asset quality, so mainly loan loss provisions level, but also ratios of nonperforming loans and loan loss reserves (both in relation to total loans).
Our main results provide evidence for a strong relationship between level of individual bank default risk and safety net features (Table 8) . Ex ante risk increases (Zscore falls) when deposit insurance limits are raised, a relationship that is strongly significant and very stable through all specifications and on different sample sizes.
The feature of partial coinsurance, borne by depositors, also leads to lower risk taking, which again is very significant statistically and stable throughout various specifications. Thus, it seems that the current policy direction of abolishing depositor coinsurance is not optimal.
6 For a detailed study of intragroup transactions between European parent banks and their foreign subsidiaries see Allen et al. (2011) . Control variables indicate that bank default risk is higher in countries with worse macroeconomic conditions, while the most important internal driver of ex ante bank risk is loan growth.
In general, the broadening of the safety net leads to higher ex ante or default risk in banks and thus strong moral hazard implications exist. Deposit insurance scheme features, such as high deposit insurance limits and lack of depositor coinsurance (and low insurance premia paid by banks in some specifications) are positively related to bank risk taking. In addition, granting state aid to ailing financial institutions in a given country increases the risk of other national institutions, which has both a current and lagged effect. Notes: Equity is bank equity divided by total assets, lagged by 1 year, Loan growth is current year loan expansion (in %), Loan share is total loans to total assets, Loan deposit ratio is total loans to total client deposits, Size is total assets (divided by 1mln), GDP growth is GDP growth in constant 2000 prices, GDP per capita is in constant 2000 USD converted to EUR, Inflation is year-end price growth, Deposit insurance model is dummy variable (0 for paybox, 1 for risk minimiser), Insurance premium is premium paid to deposit insurance fund (as % of total deposits), Premium risk dependence is a dummy variable (1 for risk dependent premiums), Deposit insurance limit is the nominal limit divided by GDP per capita, Coinsurance is a dummy variable (1 if coinsurance exists), State aid case is a dummy variable (1 if state aid was granted to the financial sector in the given country and year), State aid in the past, dummy lagged variable (1 for state aid in any of the years between t-1 and t-3), Limit change a dummy variable (1 if limit change takes place in current year), Limit change past dummy for past limit changes ((1 for change in any of the years between t-1 and t-3) Date of limit change interaction term of Limit change*Deposit insurance limit, Total crisis aid -total aid to fin. Sector granted during the financial crisis.
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The relationship between ex post risk -based on asset quality -and the safety net is weaker, but is maintained and remains of the same sign (Table 9 ). The deposit insurance limit continues to have a stable and significant effect on risk throughout all asset quality specifications. Increasing this limit leads to higher loan loss provisions, higher nonperforming loans and higher loan loss reserves. On the other hand, the link between insurance limits and risk weakens in the year when the change of limit is introduced. This implies that it may take time for bank risk proxies to reflect the change in risk attitudes, and literature confirms the prevailing lag effect in asset quality ratios (see e.g. Foos at al. 2010 ). Higher insurance premia paid by banks and lack of coinsurance also increase risk taking, but not in all specifications.
State aid granted to financial institutions has both a contemporary and lagged effect upon risk, mainly visible in the non-performing loans and loan reserves levels. Additional financial support granted to banks during the financial crisis (Total crisis aid) has a positive effect on risk measured by non-performing loans and loan loss reserves, while the relationship was insignificant for risk measured by Zscore and volatilities. In conclusion, the relationship between safety net features and risk is confirmed in the ex post risk specification, but it strongly depends on the risk proxy used and the overall stability of the relationship is weaker.
Hypothesis 2
In order to assess if the relationship between safety net features and individual bank risk depends on the shareholder structure (Hypothesis 2), we estimate Equation 2 on the full bank sample.
Bank default risk (Table 10 ) remains dependent on both deposit insurance features and state aid risk, if we control for the stake held by the largest shareholder, and the relation becomes only marginally stronger in economic terms. The level of default risk of government-owned banks is higher and these banks' reactions to changes in deposit insurance limits are enormous, in comparison to privately owned institutions (almost four times larger).
Majority ownership by other financial institutions does not increase default risk, but leads to higher volatility of asset returns. In addition, for these banks raising the deposit insurance limit increases volatility of ROA, the sensitivity being two times larger than that of the remaining institutions. The effect does not materialise for Zscore, however, which implies that maybe there is an adequate equity cushion to cover for the more elevated ROA volatility. 
Earnings volatility
Spec. 1 Notes: Primary shareholder is the stake held by the largest shareholder (in %), Bank majority shareholder is a dummy variable (1 for banks that have "Bank" as majority shareholder type in Bankscope), Government majority shareholder is a dummy variable (1 for banks that have "Public authority, State, Government" as majority shareholder type in Bankscope), Full ownership is a dummy variable (1 if primary shareholder owns over 95%), Majority ownership is a dummy variable (1 if primary shareholder owns over 50%). For description of remaining variables see notes under Table 8 . 
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For the ex post risk specifications (Table 11) , results indicate that the safety net effects are sustained after accounting for shareholder structure. Deposit insurance features and state aid are again significant in the non-performing loans and loan loss reserves risk ratios, even if the economic effect is slightly lower.
On the other hand, shareholder structure and the kind of shareholder do not affect the level of ex post risk in any specification. This again proves the difference between both types of risk measures and indicates that asset risk ratios may be additionally shaped by other elements. Conversely, there is again evidence for a higher risk sensitivity towards safety net changes on the side of banks owned by other financial institutions. They prove more sensitive to deposit insurance limit changes in terms of risk measured by provisioning and reserve levels. In other words, broadening the safety net increases the risk of these banks more than that of other financial institutions. They are thus confirmed to be more susceptible to moral hazard factors.
In contrast to the ex ante risk setting, in ex post risk government owned banks tend to be less sensitive to changes in insurance limits, but this is significant only for the loan loss reserves measures.
Financial crisis effects
As shown in Section 2, Central Europe has been under macroeconomic stress during the financial crisis, even if some regions have suffered less and generally the scope of the deterioration was narrower than in some Western European countries and the US. We extend our both hypotheses and verify if during financial crises the relationship between safety net, shareholder structure and risk is modified. In order to carry out the empirical test, we introduce dummy variables for the crisis, equalling 1 for years 2008 and 2009, which allows to estimate changes in the level of bank risk. In addition, we introduce interaction terms with the crisis dummies, relating to the sensitivity towards deposit limit changes (crisis limit sensitivity), representing overall attitude to modifications in safety net, and to the shareholder structure (crisis shareholder structure), representing the potentially different role of primary shareholders during recessions.
Results reported in Table 12 provide evidence that default risk is visibly higher during the crisis, but other ex ante risk measures do not display sensitivity towards the crisis period.
This may be caused by the fact that pure volatilities of earnings are not sufficient to capture the crisis effects and only after accounting for the equity levels, does the full extent of risk become visible. Among the ex post ratios, only loan loss provisioning levels prove sensitive to Results N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 32 4 30   Table 12 . Estimation results for Equation (2) Table 8 and Table 10 .
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31 the economic recession, but with a negative sign. This implies that during the first phase of the crisis provisioning levels are lower, as banks fight to sustain bottom line profits through less generous reserve policies. Again, the already mentioned lag effect in asset quality ratios is to be considered here.
The key result in the financial crisis specification is however the stable and robust effect of decreased sensitivity of bank risk towards changes in safety net elements (represented by deposit insurance limit). This may indicate that during financial crises banks' risk levels become less dependent on formal safety net features and moral hazard declines. In other words, increasing deposit insurance limits during a crisis has a less detrimental effect on bank risk taking than during normal times. Banks may be aware of financial pressure on governments, which display a reduced ability of helping ailing banks, especially in developing countries of Central Europe. This cannot be attributed to a different position of primary shareholders in bank risk taking during recessions, as the interaction term Crisis
Shareholder Structure appears significant only in the loan loss provisioning setting. Generally, the financial crisis estimation has proven that -in Central European banks -moral hazard incentives coming from the safety net have decreased during the crisis and the shareholder structure was rather irrelevant in this process. On the other hand, we are not able to measure the lagged effects of broadening the safety net during crisis times, as the recession took place at the end of our sample period. This possibility is not to be ignored, as moral hazard incentives may appear with delays, as shown earlier.
Robustness tests
We check robustness of our results through two additional specifications. In the first robustness test, we re-estimate both equations on a modified bank sample. In the second test, we perform a random effects estimation on both equations.
In order to verify the strength of our main results, we re-estimate Hypothesis 1 on a modified bank sample. As the descriptive statistics on macroeconomic conditions (Section 2.2.) demonstrate, although the general homogeneity of Central European countries is high (in comparison to some other international samples), some outliers exist. We decide to modify our bank sample by deleting all banks from the three Baltic states. Trouble that the economies and banks in these countries experienced during the financial crisis may distort the remaining sample and drive the results for the rest of the region. We reduce our main sample by 138 5 32 Table 13 . Estimation results for Equation (1) 
22.350576
Notes: Equity is bank equity divided by total assets, lagged by 1 year, Loan growth is current year loan expansion (in %), Loan share is total loans to total assets, Loan deposit ratio is total loans to total client deposits, Size is total assets (divided by 1mln), GDP growth is GDP growth in constant 2000 prices, GDP per capita is in constant 2000 USD converted to EUR, Inflation is year-end price growth, Deposit insurance model is dummy variable (0 for paybox, 1 for risk minimiser), Insurance premium is premium paid to deposit insurance fund (as % of total deposits), Premium risk dependence is a dummy variable (1 for risk dependent premiums), Deposit insurance limit is the nominal limit divided by GDP per capita, Coinsurance is a dummy variable (1 if coinsurance exists), State aid case is a dummy variable (1 if state aid was granted to the financial sector in the given country and year), State aid in the past, dummy lagged variable (1 for state aid in any of the years between t-1 and t-3), Limit change a dummy variable (1 if limit change takes place in current year), Limit change past dummy for past limit changes ((1 for change in any of the years between t-1 and t-3).
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33 observations and run the estimations for both ex ante and ex post risk proxies. The results of verifying Hypothesis 1 on a restricted sample are presented in Table 13 .
In general, our conclusions regarding the relationship between safety net and bank risk are confirmed. However, the relationship changes for the restricted sample size. For the ex ante risk, the previously robust relationship between risk and deposit insurance limit weakens or disappears and only lack of coinsurance remains a stable risk driver. In addition, state aid granted to financial institutions does not affect current or lagged levels of default risk. On the other hand, for ex post risk proxies the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk visibly strengthens, both in terms of the economic and statistical significance. State aid remains meaningless for ex post risk levels in this sample.
In order to verify the conclusions on Hypothesis 2, we re-estimate the Equation 2 on the restricted bank sample. The results are mixed, as in case of Hypothesis 1 re-estimation.
The relationship between safety net impulses and ex ante risk visibly weakens, with the coinsurance feature again playing a role in risk taking. Risk measured through ex post proxies remains dependent on the safety net, mostly through deposit insurance features however, which again proves that state aid effects may be strongly driven by the Baltic country banks in our total sample.
As far as the relationship between shareholder structure, risk and the safety net is concerned, results are mixed. Government owned banks in the non-Baltic CE countries no longer display higher risk levels, but their high sensitivity to deposit limit changes persists, while privately owned banks seem immune to deposit limit changes. On the other hand, increasing deposit insurance limits results in lower loan loss reserves in government banks, which may not necessarily be a sign of lower asset risk. These institutions may decide to create lower reserves, when news about an anticipated deposit limit increase surface, relying on an increased governmental propensity to cover bank losses.
In the reduced sample, bank ownership is confirmed to result in higher absolute risk levels, as measured through ROA volatility, and their higher sensitivity to deposit limit changes is again mirrored in the loan loss provisioning levels. Thus, increased sensitivity towards moral incentives in bank owned financial institutions persists. Notes: For variable description see Table 9 and Table 10 .
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35 Although the results of the Hausman test on our estimation implies using the fixed effects approach, we decide to run a random effects estimation as a robustness check. The results of estimating Equation (1) in a random effects specification are shown in Table 15, while Equation (2) is presented in Table 16 .
In general, the random effects specification confirms both robustness and direction of the relationship between safety net and bank risk. Broadening of the deposit insurance schemes and state aid boost risk incentives for banks, although the effect differs again for various risk proxies. The sensitivity towards moral hazard incentives coming from the deposit insurance appears with a lag, as the interaction term between the year of changing the deposit limit and the limit itself implies a decreased sensitivity if the change took place in the current year. On the other hand, the random effects model displays lack of link between past state aid and present level of risk, an effect that surfaced strongly and consistently in the fixed effects estimation. Last but not least, a strong procyclicality of risk towards the economic cycle becomes visible, with periods of high growth accompanied by decreasing risk proxies.
Estimation of Hypothesis 2 through the random effects specification does not change conclusions on the safety net versus risk debate. However, some conclusions regarding the role of shareholder structure in risk taking should be treated with caution. The random effects model reveals no link between government owned banks and risk, neither regarding its absolute level nor special risk sensitivity of government banks towards safety net changes. On the other hand, a higher default risk appears on the side of bank owned financial institutions, and their sensitivity towards safety net modifications differs from the rest of the sample in some settings. In general, these effects are not very stable however and are not sufficient to override the conclusions from the fixed effects specification.
Conclusions
The aim of this analysis was to analyse moral hazard incentives that the broadening of country safety nets may produce for bank risk taking in Central Europe. Furthermore, we intended to establish if shareholder structure characteristics may modify the moral hazard framework produced by the safety net in the region. Both hypotheses were estimated using a c.200 bank sample from eleven Central European countries, encompassing the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , supplemented by a hand-collected database of regulatory factors.
We find a strong, stable and adverse effect that the broadening of financial safety net may have on individual bank risk levels in Central Europe. The moral hazard effect materialises on current risk and is maintained with a lag of up to three years. The results are 6 36 confirmed using various specifications, both on the risk side and on the sample size. On the other hand, we find that the adverse influence of broadening the safety net may decrease during financial crises. During recessions, banks' risk levels become less dependent on formal safety net features and moral hazard declines. Banks may realise a decreased importance of explicit safety net features during such periods and no longer adjust their risk levels to the declared scope of a safety net. It is important to keep in mind however that it is too early to analyse the full moral hazard effects of the financial crisis era, as lagged effects may still surface and our estimation period finishes in 2010.
Shareholder structure does not fundamentally change the relationship between bank risk and safety net features in Central Europe. We find higher ex ante risk levels for government owned banks and their sensitivity to changing safety net characteristics is also stronger in some settings. These results are however not stable for all risk specifications.
More robust findings are demonstrated for financial institutions owned by banks. In some settings, they prove more risky than their peers. More importantly, however, there is stable evidence for their higher risk sensitivity towards safety net changes, so broadening the safety net increases the risk of these banks more than that of other financial institutions. Bankowned institutions in Central Europe seem thus to be more susceptible to moral hazard factors, although again the result is not universal for all risk proxies.
Our results highlight that introducing broader safety net schemes in Central Europe has important costs in terms of bank risk levels. In addition, some banks react to such changes more aggressively than others and shareholder structure may play an important role.
Surprisingly, having a majority shareholder in the form of a (usually powerful) bank does not alleviate the moral hazard problem and indicates that such banks still refer to country safety nets as their financial backup. In consequence, we believe that broadening of the financial safety net in Central Europe should be accompanied by a well-designed regulatory framework, which curbs excessive bank risk taking that could lead to financial stability problems. 
37
